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local currency pricing. There are no gains from international monetary coopera-
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1 Introduction
Price stability is widely viewed as a benchmark monetary policy for central banks, and has been
found to be optimal in many closed economy studies.1 However, there is a longstanding debate
over the desirability of price stability in the open economy. Asymmetric shocks, current account
imbalances, cross-border pricing decisions, terms of trade movements, strategic interaction
between countries, policy cooperation and other elements unique to the open economy introduce
complications that are not present in the closed economy. These additional ingredients present
a challenge for understanding optimal policy in the open economy.
In the classic case of producer currency pricing (PCP), exchange rate fluctuations pass-
through into imported goods prices one-for-one. Under PCP, the first generation of micro-
founded models proved that a central bank should mimic the flexible price allocation, em-
phasizing the isomorphism between optimal monetary policy in closed and open economies
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002)). But the optimality of price
stability hinged on two crucial assumptions: unitary elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods, and PCP. Unitary elasticity implies complete risk-sharing across countries
via terms-of-trade movements, so that households face no idiosyncratic consumption risk in
complete markets, incomplete markets or financial autarky (Cole and Obstfeld (1991)). Coun-
terfactually, under unitary elasticity export revenues are constant and immune to exchange
rate fluctuations and productivity shocks. No expenditure switching occurs, so that household
consumption does not shift to goods from “cheaper” countries (countries with a depreciated
currency for example).
Benigno and Benigno (2003) relaxed this assumption, and showed that price stability is
no longer optimal for PCP under non-unitary elasticity. Their work affirmed a central bank’s
incentive to manipulate its terms of trade, removing the isomorphism between optimal monetary
policy in closed and open economies.2 In addition, a number of studies have shown that
under local currency pricing (LCP), when exchange rate fluctuations do not pass-through into
imported goods prices, price stability is not optimal (Devereux and Engel (2003), Corsetti and
1In this paper, we refer to price stability as the policy which implements the flexible price allocation. A non-
exhaustive list of papers finding price stability to be optimal in closed economies includes Goodfriend and
King (1997, 2001), King and Wolman (1998), and Woodford (2000, 2002). See Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2011) for a recent survey. A counterexample is provided by multi-sector models such as that in Aoki (2001).
2Benigno and Benigno (2003) hearkened back to the earlier predictions of non-microfounded models, which
established a deflationary bias in the open economy due to a central bank’s incentive to appreciate its
terms of trade (Rogoff (1985), Oudiz and Sachs (1984), and Canzoneri and Henderson (1990)). Benigno
and Benigno (2006) later showed that price stability is optimal for large open economies under non-unitary
elasticity when central banks cooperate and markets are complete. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010) also
examine optimal monetary policy under financial autarky, and show that price stability is never optimal in
financial autarky for large open economies. This contrasts with our results for small open economies, where
price stability is optimal under PCP in all cases, even in financial autarky.
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Pesenti (2005), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010)).3
In this paper, we study the theoretical conditions under which price stability is optimal in
a continuum of small open economies. We solve the model globally in closed form without
restricting the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods to one. To the best of
our knowledge, we derive the first closed-form solution for an open economy model that allows
substitutability to differ from one, enabling us to consider cases away from perfect risk-sharing,
including financial autarky. As in Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001, 2005), Devereux and Engel (2003), Sutherland (2004) and others, we assume one-period
in advance price setting and no home bias.
While previous studies of optimal monetary policy in small open economies focus on PCP
with non-cooperative policymakers, we give an exact characterization of optimal monetary
policy and welfare with and without international policy cooperation for PCP and LCP, in
complete markets and financial autarky.4 The continuum framework allows us to examine the
implications of international policy cooperation and solve for Nash equilibria, which is not pos-
sible in the standard small open economy setup where there is only one measure zero small open
economy and one “rest of the world” block. Combined with our closed form solution, we obtain
exact welfare gains resulting from cooperation amongst a continuum of small, interdependent
economies.5
Our results point to the importance of country size in the conduct of optimal monetary policy.
We prove that for small open economies implementing the flexible price allocation through a
policy of price stability is optimal under PCP, while a fixed exchange rate is optimal under
LCP. Both results hold for any elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, in
complete markets and financial autarky, with or without international policy cooperation. We
3Devereux and Engel (2003) study optimal monetary policy for two large open economies under PCP and LCP
in a complete markets model with unitary elasticity and find that a fixed exchange rate is the optimal policy
under LCP. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010) examine LCP under non-unitary elasticity in complete
markets and financial autarky for cooperative policymakers, and show that a fixed exchange rate is not
optimal. We do the same exercise for small open economies and find that a fixed exchange rate is optimal
for LCP in all cases examined, for any elasticity.
4A non-exhaustive list of studies of optimal monetary policy in small open economies includes Gali and
Monacelli (2005), Faia and Monacelli (2008), De Paoli (2009), Catao and Chang (2012), Hevia and Nicolini
(2012) and Monacelli (2012). Generally, these papers allow for a richer specification and show various results
depending on the emphasis and specific ingredients. All focus on PCP and do not examine potential gains
from cooperation. Modeling LCP in a continuum of small open economies is quite difficult because the law
of one price and purchasing power parity no longer hold. With two economies, it is not hard to keep track
of exchange rate policy, but in the continuum this proves more challenging.
5To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine cooperation within the continuum framework. Our
analysis does not face the problems encountered when conducting such an exercise in a log-linear model. In
a log-linear model, the steady state will be different in cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. As such,
it is not clear how to make an accurate comparison of welfare between cooperative and non-cooperative
regimes. This is one reason why there was such an emphasis on closed-form solutions in the early micro-
founded literature on international policy cooperation. See Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) and Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2001, 2002). In this paper we focus only on monetary policy cooperation, but in a related paper
we consider optimal fiscal policy and fiscal cooperation across countries (Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013)).
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also show that international monetary cooperation does not improve welfare for small open
economies. Under central bank commitment, the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions
exactly coincide under any combination of PCP, LCP, complete markets and financial autarky
for any elasticity of substitution.6
The driving force behind our results is the absence of strategic interaction among policymak-
ers due to their small size in proportion to the rest of the world. Even when substitutability
is different from one, the share of each country’s output in the world consumption basket, and
therefore the impact of the country’s monopoly power, is negligible. Small open economies are
analogous to firms in a model of monopolistic competition: policymakers have market power but
cannot influence the behavior of other countries in the model. Strategic interactions between
countries are thus absent.
The absence of strategic interaction has very different implications under PCP and LCP.
Under PCP, the policy decisions of small open economies have no effect on consumption baskets
in foreign countries, which shuts down the expenditure switching channel abroad. Unable to
induce expenditure switching or influence foreign income, policymakers charge a constant terms
of trade markup, utilizing monopoly power at the country level. Monopolistic producers in our
model also charge a constant markup utilizing their monopoly power at the firm level within
each country, but policymakers remove this domestic markup via production subsidies. Since
monetary policy can only affect the variance and not the level of these constant markups, the
optimal solution for the policymaker under PCP is to mimic the flexible price allocation.
In contrast, when economies are large, policymakers must internalize the effect of their de-
cisions on the rest of the world. When domestic policymakers charge higher markups, foreign
households become poorer and shift consumption toward cheaper products. Under PCP, expen-
diture switching abroad forces policymakers in large economies to behave more cooperatively
and charge lower markups. Since the relative size of an economy changes stochastically with
productivity shocks, the domestic policymaker in a large open economy finds it optimal to
deviate from flexible prices and charge a variable markup rather than a constant one.
Under LCP, prices are fixed one period in advance in the currency of the importer, so the
proportion of income allocated to country-specific goods is insulated from monetary policy
and exogenous shocks. As a result, a constant proportion of world income is spent on each
country’s unique variety, and expenditure switching does not occur. In addition, small open
economies cannot affect world income, so domestic output and labor are unaffected by monetary
policy. The central bank thus maximizes welfare by stabilizing domestic consumption via a
fixed exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate, labor fluctuates with productivity shocks
6This matches results for large economies under unitary elasticity (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002)), where gains
from cooperation are absent, but contrasts with results for large open economies under non-unitary elasticity
(Benigno and Benigno (2006), Corsetti et al (2010) and Sutherland (2004)), where gains are present.
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while consumption remains constant.
In contrast, monetary policy in large open economies can influence domestic labor under
LCP. Expansionary monetary policy at home will increase wages, while goods prices remain
fixed. This induces home and foreign households to work more, since domestic and foreign firms
face higher demand for their goods. Higher real wages and an increase in hours worked lead
to higher domestic consumption. Policymakers in large open economies thus face a trade-off
between labor and consumption volatility. In such cases, a fixed exchange rate is no longer
optimal.7
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by laying out the model for PCP in Section 2. In
Section 3, we examine optimal monetary policy in the closed economy to develop intuition, and
then move to the open economy where we solve for optimal monetary policy under PCP, first
in complete markets and then in financial autarky. Finally, we lay out the model for LCP in
Section 4, and solve for optimal monetary policy in complete markets and financial autarky.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a continuum of small open economies represented by the unit interval, as popular-
ized in the literature by Gali and Monacelli (2005).8 Each economy consists of a representative
household and a representative firm. All countries are identical ex-ante: they have the same
preferences, technology, and price-setting. Ex-post, economies will differ depending on the re-
alization of their technology shock. Households are immobile across countries, however goods
can move freely across borders. Each economy produces one final good, over which it exercises
a degree of monopoly power. This is crucially important: countries are able to manipulate their
terms of trade even though they are measure zero. However, because countries are small there
will be no strategic interaction. As explained in the introduction, the expenditure switching
effect and the ability to influence foreign income are both absent when economies are small.
Policymakers will thus charge a constant terms of trade markup on their exports.
We use one-period-in-advance price setting to introduce nominal rigidities.9 Monopolistic
firms set next-period’s nominal prices, in terms of domestic currency, prior to next-period’s
production and consumption decisions. These firms will charge a constant markup in the flex-
price equilibrium, utilizing their monopoly power at the firm level. Given this preset price,
firms supply as much output as demanded by households.
7Unless labor enters the utility function as a linear term, as in Devereux and Engel (2003), in which case a
fixed exchange rate is optimal. In our model, labor enters the utility function as a non-linear term but we
still find that a fixed exchange rate is optimal under LCP.
8A similar version of this model appears in Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013) where we employ wage rigidity
instead of price rigidity and study the optimal design of a fiscal union within a currency union.
9Assuming rigid wages or prices has no impact on the results: they yield identical policy implications.
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We lay out a general framework below, and then hone in on two specific cases: complete
markets and financial autarky. To avoid additional notation, we ignore time subindices unless
absolutely necessary. When time subindices are absent, we are implicitly referring to period t.
Households In each economy i ∈ [0, 1], there is a representative household with lifetime
expected utility
Et−1
{ ∞∑
k=0
βk
(
C1−σit+k
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit+k
1 + ϕ
)}
(1)
where β < 1 is the household discount factor, C is the consumption basket or index, and N is
household labor effort (think of this as hours worked). Households face a general budget con-
straint that nests both complete markets and financial autarky; we will discuss the differences
between the two in subsequent sections. For now, it is sufficient to simply write out the most
general form of the budget constraint:
Cit = (1− τi)
(
Wit
Pit
)
Nit +Dit + Tit. (2)
The non-distortionary tax rate on household labor income in country i is denoted by τi, while
Tit is a lump-sum tax rebate to households. Net taxes equal zero in the model, as any amount of
government revenue is rebated lump-sum to households. The consumer price index corresponds
to Pit, while the nominal wage is Wit. Dit denotes state-contingent portfolio payments expressed
in real consumption units, and can be written in more detail as:
DitPit =
∫ 1
0
EijtBijtdj, (3)
where Bijt is a state-contingent payment in currency j.
10 Eijt is the exchange rate in units of
currency i per one unit of currency j; an increase in Eijt signals a depreciation of currency i
relative to currency j. When international asset markets are complete, households perform all
cross-border trades in contingent claims in period 0, insuring against all possible states in all
future periods. The transverality condition simply states that all period 0 transactions must
be balanced: payment for claims issued must equal payment for claims received. Leaving the
details in the appendix, we use the following relationship as the transversality condition for
complete markets:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtC−σit Dit
}
= 0, (4)
10Equation (3) holds in all possible states in all periods. Details are provided in Appendix A.1.
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while in financial autarky
Dit = 0.
Intuitively, the transversality condition (4) stipulates that the present discounted value of future
earnings should be equal to the present discounted value of future consumption flows. Under
complete markets, consumers choose a state contingent plan for consumption, labor supply and
portfolio holdings in period 0.
Consumption and Price Indices Households in each country consume a basket of imported
goods. This consumption basket is an aggregate of all of the varieties produced by different
countries. The consumption basket for a representative small open economy i, which is common
across countries, is defined as follows:
Ci =
[∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] γ
γ−1
(5)
where cij is the consumption by country i of the final good produced by country j, and γ is
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (the Armington elasticity).
Because there is no home bias in consumption, countries will export all of the output of their
unique variety, and import varieties from other countries to assemble the consumption basket.
Prices are defined as follows: upper case Pij denotes the price in country i (in currency i) of
the unique final good produced in country j, while CPIi is the aggregate consumer price index
in country i. Given the above consumption index, the consumer price index will be:
CPIi =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−γij dj
] 1
1−γ
. (6)
Consumption by country i of the unique variety produced by country j is:
cij =
[
Pij
CPIi
]−γ
Ci. (7)
We assume that producer currency pricing (PCP) holds, and that the law of one price (LOP)
holds, so that the price of the same good is equal across countries when converted into a common
currency. We define the nominal bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j, Eij, as units
of currency i per one unit of currency j. LOP requires that:
Pij = EijPjj. (8)
Given LOP and identical preferences across countries, PPP will also hold for all i, j country
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pairs:
CPIi = EijCPIj, (9)
The terms of trade for country j will be:
TOTj =
PExports from j
PImports to j
=
Pjj
CPIj
, (10)
where TOTj is defined as the home currency price of exports over the home currency price of
imports. Since the domestic consumption basket is entirely composed of foreign inputs, the
domestic CPI will be equal to the home currency price of imports. Now we can take (7), and
using (8) and (9), solve for demand for country j’s unique variety:
Yj =
∫ 1
0
cijdi =
∫ 1
0
[
Pij
CPIi
]−γ
Cidi
(8)+(9)
=
[
Pjj
CPIj
]−γ ∫ 1
0
Cidi = TOT
−γ
j Cw. (11)
where Cw is defined as the average world consumption across all i economies, Cw =
∫ 1
0
Cidi.
Production Each economy i consists of a group of intermediate goods producers, h ∈ [0, 1],
who exercise monopoly power over their unique variety, and a perfectly competitive final goods
exporter who aggregates the intermediates in CES fashion into a final export good. For simplic-
ity, we assume that intermediates are non-tradable. Thus, each country will bundle its inter-
mediates into one final export good.11 Figure 1 below illustrates the bundling of intermediates
into a final export good, and the bundling of those exports into the household consumption
basket. We differentiate between the markup on intermediate domestic goods (µ = ε
ε−1) and
the markup on the final export good (µγ =
γ
γ−1), which is imposed only if policymakers decide
to manipulate their terms of trade.
Figure 1
11We assume non-tradable intermediates with a final tradable consumption good that aggregates those inter-
mediates for simplicity. In Gali and Monacelli’s (2005, 2008) setup, intermediate goods are tradable, such
that every country’s import consumption basket is made up of an infinite number of varieties imported from
an infinite number of countries. This requires integrating over two continuums. While it is straightforward
for us to maintain their setup, we prefer the tractable alternative: a final goods exporter bundles the do-
mestically produced intermediates for export. In this way, each country produces only one unique variety,
and we only need integrate over one continuum. This assumption does not change the results in any way.
In both cases the household consumption basket in each country is made up of imported goods from all i
countries, which are themselves made up of intermediates produced domestically.
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Production of intermediates requires technology Zi, which is common across firms within a
country, and labor Ni(h), which is unique to each firm. We do not need to assume a specific
distribution for technology, a luxury afforded by our closed form solution. We do assume that
technology is independent across time and across countries, but is identical across firms within
the same country. Given this, the production function of a representative intermediate goods
firm h in country i will be:
yi(h) = Zini(h). (12)
Because intermediate goods firms produce differentiated varities, they have monopoly power
over their output, which leads to a markup in intermediate goods. Perfectly competitive fi-
nal goods exporters aggregate the intermediate input of each firm, so that production of the
representative final exporter in a specific country is:
Yi =
[∫ 1
0
yi(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
, (13)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between different intermediates, and µ = ε
ε−1 is the
markup. The price of the final good in country i, Pii, will be a function of the nominal price
for intermediate goods, pi(h):
Pii =
[∫ 1
0
pi(h)
1−εdh
] 1
1−ε
.
Cost minimization by the perfectly competitive final goods exporter leads to the following
demand for intermediates:
yi(h) =
[
pi(h)
Pii
]−ε
Yi. (14)
In summary, monopoly power may be exercised at the firm and the country level: at the firm
level because of differentiated domestic varieties, and at the country level because each economy
produces a unique variety for export. Policymakers can use this country-level monopoly power
to manipulate their terms of trade. But again, because economies are small and cannot affect
world income or induce expenditure switching abroad, policymakers will choose a constant
terms of trade markup. Households and final goods exporters have no monopoly power and are
perfectly competitive.12
12It is entirely plausible to shift the country-level monopoly power from the policymaker to the final goods
exporter. All results will be exactly the same: terms of trade markups will be constant — just as in a model
of monopolistic competition. As such, price stability will remain optimal under PCP.
9
Intermediate goods firms will price their unique good one-period-in-advance according to the
following condition, which results from profit maximization:
pit(h) = µ
Et−1
{
C−σit yit(h)
Wit
ZitCPIi
}
Et−1
{
C−σit yit(h)
CPIit
} . (15)
Households maximize utility (1) subject to their budget constraint (2). The FOC with respect
to labor will give the following household labor supply condition:
Wit
CPIit
=
(
χ
1− τi
)
NϕitC
σ
it. (16)
Firms are identical, so that in equilibrium pi(h) = Pii and yi(h) = Zini(h) = ZiNi = Yi.
Using the labor demand condition (15) and the labor supply condition (16), and the fact that
prices are preset at time t− 1, the labor market clearing condition will be:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit YitTOTi
} . (17)
This is the general labor market clearing condition; it holds in the closed economy and in
the open economy for PCP. Under PCP, the demand for the unique variety (11) will give the
following labor market clearing condition:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} . (18)
Taking the expectations operator out of (18) will give the flexible price equilibrium for PCP.
We now turn our attention to the difference between complete markets and financial autarky.
2.1 Complete Markets
In this section, we assume that agents in each economy trade a full set of domestic and foreign
state-contingent assets. Households in all countries will maximize their utility (1), choosing
consumption, leisure, money holdings, and a complete set of state-contingent nominal bonds,
subject to (2).
Risk-Sharing Complete markets and PPP imply the following risk-sharing condition:
C−σit
C−σit+1
=
C−σjt
C−σjt+1
∀i, j (19)
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which states that the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption at time t and t+ 1 must be
equal across all countries. Importantly, this condition does not imply that consumption is equal
across countries. Consumption in country i will depend on its initial asset position, monetary
policy, the distribution of country-specific shocks, the covariance of global and local shocks,
and other factors.
When the central bank in economy i changes its policy, the consumption allocation in country
i may change as well. For example, monetary policy can affect the covariance between home
production and world consumption, and this covariance will influence the level of household
consumption even under complete markets. The risk-sharing condition (19) and the transver-
sality condition (4) are both robust to changes in monetary policy. If we combine the two, the
resulting goods market clearing condition will also be robust to changes in monetary policy.
We solve for this condition in the appendix, and simply state the result below.
Lemma 1 When (4),(17), and (19) hold, consumption in country i can be expressed as a
function of world consumption.
Cit =
Et−1
{∑∞
t=1 β
t
[
YitC
−σ
wt TOTit
]}
Et−1
{∑∞
t=1 β
tC1−σwt
} Cwt. (20)
Using the fact that Zit is independent across time and and across countries, and prices are
preset, (20) is equivalent to
Cit = Et−1 {YitTOTit} = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
. (21)
2.2 Financial Autarky
The aggregate resource constraint under financial autarky specifies that the nominal value of
output in the home country (exports) must equal the nominal of consumption in the home
country (imports). That is, trade in goods must be balanced. In a model with cross-border
lending, bonds would also show up in this condition, but in financial autarky, they are obviously
absent. The primary departure from complete markets lies in the household and economy-wide
budget constraints.
Pii · Yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
= CPIi · Ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imports
(22)
Using the fact that (11) holds under both complete markets and financial autarky, and substi-
tuting this into (22), one can show that demand for country i’s good in financial autarky will
be
Cit = C
1
γ
wtY
γ−1
γ
it . (23)
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Complete markets and autarky differ only by goods market clearing. In complete markets
consumption is equal to expected domestic output expressed in consumption baskets; in autarky
consumption is equal to realized domestic output expressed in consumption baskets.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy
Now that we’ve laid out the model in detail, for both complete markets and financial autarky,
we consider optimal policy for a variety of scenarios. Without loss of generality, we assume a
cashless limiting economy.13 Central banks will optimize by choosing labor instead of money
supply or an interest rate rule, but all three are equivalent in this model: money supply will
determine the interest rate, which will in turn determine labor. One can easily write down a
money supply rule or interest rate rule that exactly implements the allocation resulting from
optimization over labor. But for the sake of simplicity, we assume the central bank optimizes
over labor.
The timing of the model is described in Figure 2 below. Before any shocks are realized,
national central banks declare their policy for all states of the world. With this knowledge
in hand, households lay out a state-contingent plan for consumption, labor, money and asset
holdings. After that, shocks hit the economy. Note that under financial autarky, no interna-
tional asset trading will occur.
Figure 2
Central
bank
declares
monetary
policy
-1
Household
makes
state-contingent
plan
0
Period 1
shocks are
realized
1 2, 3, ..., t-1
Period t shocks
are realized
t
We begin with an analysis of optimal monetary policy in a closed economy version of our
model, and then proceed to the open economy. In all cases, we consider optimal policy under
commitment.
3.1 Closed Economy
The Flexible Price Allocation
To solve for the flexible price allocation in the closed economy, simply take expectations out
of (17), set TOTi = 1, and use goods market clearing (Yt = Ct = NtZt). This will give us a
13Benigno and Benigno (2003) describe a cashless-limiting economy in detail in their appendix, pp.756-758.
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system of two equations in two unknowns, Nt and Ct:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
N1+ϕt
C1−σt
,
Ct = NtZt.
The solution to this two equation system is the flexible price allocation for the closed economy:
Ct =
(
1−τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t .
Optimal Monetary Policy
The central bank will choose labor to maximize the expected utility of the representative agent,
given the closed economy labor market and goods market clearing constraints.
max
Nt
Et−1
{
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕt
(1 + ϕ)
}
(24)
s.t.
1 =
(
χµ
1− τ
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕt
}
Et−1
{
C1−σt
} (25)
Ct =ZtNt (26)
Although it is standard practice to use a welfare-loss function for optimal policy evaluation, we
can simply use the household utility function because of our global, closed-form solution.14
Proposition 2 In the closed economy under ex ante commitment, the central bank will maxi-
mize (24) subject to (25) and (26). The solution to this problem is: Ct =
(
1−τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . Price
stability is the optimal policy, as the central bank exactly replicates the flexible price allocation.
Proof See Appendix A. 
Optimal Policy Under A Social Planner
Proposition 3 In the closed economy, the social planner will maximize (24) subject to (26),
ignoring the labor condition (25). The solution to this problem is: Ct =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . The
social planner will replicate the flexible price allocation and remove the monopolistic markup,
yielding the Pareto efficient allocation.
Proof See Appendix A. 
14The only reason to use a welfare-loss function is if the model in question must be approximated around a
steady state. Here, no such approximation is required, and thus a welfare-loss function is not needed.
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In comparing the solutions described in Proposition 1 and 2, notice that the social planner
mimics the flexible price allocation while eliminating the monopolistic markup µ (Proposition
2), while the markup and labor tax remain when we only consider optimal monetary policy
(Proposition 1). In the case of ex ante commitment in Proposition 1, a fiscal authority may
introduce subsidies to exactly offset the markup and replicate the social planner equilibrium.
It is straightforwad to show that τ = 1− µ will get rid of the monopolistic distortion on labor
inputs and give the Pareto efficient allocation.
We’ve studied optimal policy in the closed economy, and proved the optimality of price
stability. The divine coincidence holds, a well known result in the closed economy. One already
sees the link between stable monopolistic markups and a desire to mimic the flexible price
allocation. We now turn our attention to the open economy, where we prove that optimal
monetary policy in closed and small open economies is isomorphic in both complete markets
and financial autarky.
3.2 Global Social Planner
The global social planner is a benevolent “dictator” that distributes goods across countries in
order to maximize aggregate world utility. This scenario is analogous to perfect cooperation
among the social planner’s of all i countries. The global social planner solution defines the
Pareto efficient allocation. Since the economies in our model are identical ex-ante, the global
social planner will maximize a weighted utility function over all i countries,∫ 1
0
[
C1−σi
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕi
(1 + ϕ)
]
di, (27)
subject to the consumption basket and the aggregate resource constraint:
Ci =
[∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] γ
γ−1
, (28)
Yi =ZiNi =
∫ 1
0
cjidj. (29)
Proposition 4 The global social planner will maximize utility weighted over all i countries
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(27), subject to (28) and (29). The solution to this optimization problem is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1
1 + ϕ
)
,
Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w ,
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i ,
Yi =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i ,
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
.
The global social planner solution exactly replicates the flexible price allocation while eliminating
monopolistic markups, yielding the Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof See Appendix A. 
The global social planner allocation above is a traditional benchmark for the evaluation of
different policy regimes. Because this is the Pareto efficient allocation, it provides a natural
marker with which to compare various policies under commitment. Notice that there are no
markups in the Pareto efficient allocation: the benevolent global social planner has eliminated
the markup on intermediate goods µ, and resisted the temptation to manipulate the terms of
trade. In the next sections we will look closely at optimal monetary policy for central banks
and see what conditions are necessary to replicate the global social planner allocation.
3.3 Complete Markets
In this section we examine the optimal monetary policy for cooperative and non-cooperative
central banks in complete markets. The objective functions for cooperative and non-cooperative
central banks are below.
max
Nit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
(30a)
max
∀Nit
∫ 1
0
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
di (30b)
Non-cooperative central banks will choose the optimal amount of labor to maximize their
domestic welfare (30a), while cooperative central banks will choose the optimal amount of
labor in order to maximize the welfare of all i economies (30b). In both cases, policymakers
will maximize the appropriate objective function subject to labor market clearing (31) and
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goods market clearing (32) constraints, and production (33) and aggregate world consumption
(34):
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} , (31)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
, (32)
Yit = ZitNit, (33)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (34)
Proposition 5 In complete markets, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (30a) and
cooperative central banks will maximize (30b), subject to (31), (32), (33) and (34). The solution
under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central banks in complete markets
is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mimick-
ing the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central banks
in complete markets, and is the optimal policy under cooperation.
Proof See Appendix A. 
There are a few important points to note from this exercise. First of all, note that consump-
tion in the optimal allocation is not subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. Because we are
in complete markets, consumption is simply a function of average world technology. Second,
note that cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria are identical: both yield the flexible price
allocation.
In complete markets, we’ve shown that small open economy central banks will mimic the
flexible price allocation under both cooperative and non-cooperative regimes, for any elasticity
16
of substitution between home and foreign goods. In addition, we’ve demonstrated that inter-
national monetary cooperation has no impact on welfare. This is because monetary policy has
no power against non-contingent distortions like markups, and can only address the contingent
price rigidity distortion. In the next section, we conduct the same exercise for financial autarky.
3.4 Financial Autarky
In financial autarky, the objective functions for cooperative and non-cooperative central banks
will be identical to those in complete markets. The only difference in the optimization problem
will be in the goods market constraint. In complete markets home consumption is a function of
expected output (32), while in autarky home consumption is a function of actual output (36).
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Et−1
{
N1+ηit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
w,t
} (35)
Cit = C
1
γ
w,tY
γ−1
γ
it (36)
Yit = ZitNit (37)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (38)
Proposition 6 In financial autarky, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (30a) and
cooperative central banks will maximize (30b), subject to (35), (36), (37) and (38). The solution
under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central banks in financial autarky
is:
E{Ui} = Ci
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
,
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1+ϕ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
,
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1−σ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
,
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1−σ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
Zi,
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
i di
) 1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
.
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mimick-
ing the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central banks
in financial autarky, and is the optimal policy under cooperation.
Proof See Appendix A. 
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Note that in financial autarky, consumption is a function of idiosyncratic technology Zi,
reflecting the lack of international risk-sharing. As in complete markets, the optimal policy for
cooperative and non-cooperative central banks is to mimic the flexible price equilibrium. We
thus demonstrate the isomorphism between optimal monetary policy in closed and small open
economies for both complete markets and financial autarky.
As we’ve stated before, the key to this isomorphism is the absence of strategic interaction
when economies are small. Unable to influence foreign consumption or foreign income, poli-
cymakers in small open economies charge a constant terms of trade markup on their exports.
Combined with monopolistic firms charging a constant markup, the optimal policy response is
to remove price rigidities and return to the flexible price allocation. Similarly, when elasticity is
unitary and economies are large, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2002), strategic interactions between countries are nullified by a lack of expenditure switching
and complete risk-sharing via terms of trade movements, and price stability is optimal.
4 Local Currency Pricing
We now turn our attention to the case of LCP. Modeling LCP in a continuum of small open
economies is difficult because the law of one price and purchasing power parity no longer hold.
In two economy models, keeping track of exchange rate policy is trivial, but in the continuum
this becomes challenging. Although we will gloss over many of the methodological nuances
necessary to deal with LCP in the continuum, all modeling details can be found in Appendix
B. To simplify expressions, we assume log utility (σ = 1), but allow ϕ to vary as before.
Under LCP, firms price their export good one-period-in-advance in the currency of the im-
porting country. As such, there is zero exchange rate pass-through into import prices. Each
country’s consumer price index will thus be fixed one-period-in-advance, as exchange rate move-
ments will have no impact on import prices. When firms price in this way, the labor market
and goods market clearing constraints will differ from those under PCP. In complete markets
and financial autarky, goods and labor market clearing conditions for LCP are:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
) Et−1 {N1+ϕit }
Et−1
{
C−1it YitTOTit
} , (39)
Cit =
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit. (40)
To keep track of exchange rate policy in the continuum, we introduce the concept of a numeraire
currency, which we assume is the currency of country 0. Thus, Ei0t is the exchange rate between
country i and the numeraire country, and P0it is the import price of the numeraire country’s
good in currency i.
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Proposition 7 Under LCP, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (30a) subject to (39)
and (40). A fixed exchange rate will be the Nash equilibrium policy for a non-cooperative central
bank in both complete markets and financial autarky under LCP.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Et−1
{
C−σit YitEi0t
}
=
χµ
1− τi
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1 {Cjt}
Et−1 {E0jtCjt} , (41)
Cit = Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjtE0jtdj. (42)
Proposition 8 Under LCP, cooperative central banks will maximize (30b) subject to (41) and
(42). The optimal policy for cooperative central banks in both complete markets and financial
autarky will be a fixed exchange rate.
Proof See Appendix B. 
Price stability is no longer optimal under LCP. Instead, central banks should fix the exchange
rate. Why is a fixed exchange rate optimal under LCP? As we discussed in the introduction,
LCP insulates household consumption baskets in each country from exchange rate fluctuations,
guaranteeing a constant proportion of world income spent on each unique import good because
exchange rate fluctuations do not pass-through into imported goods prices. Policymakers in
small open economies are also unable to influence world income. Therefore domestic output and
labor are unaffected by monetary policy. Stabilizing consumption becomes the central bank’s
goal, and the policy mechanism to achieve this goal is a fixed exchange rate. With a fixed
exchange rate, labor fluctuates with productivity shocks but consumption remains constant. In
contrast, when economies are large, monetary policy can influence domestic labor under LCP.
In such cases, a fixed exchange rate is no longer optimal as shown by Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2010). The reasons for this are outlined in the introduction.
5 Conclusion
We derive the first closed-form solution for an open economy model that does not restrict
substitutability between home and foreign goods to one. Different from the standard modeling
framework in the literature, we assume a continuum of small open economies interacting in
general equilibrium, rather than two large open economies. The tractability of our framework
requires simplifying assumptions along other dimensions. Prices are set one period in advance,
and each country exports all of its production and imports varieties from all other countries to
aggregate into a final consumption basket. Using this setup, we answer the following question:
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What are the theoretical conditions under which it is optimal for a central bank to mimic the
flexible price allocation?
We prove that for PCP, small open economy central banks should mimic the flexible price
allocation for any elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, in cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibria, in both complete markets and financial autarky. Policymakers
should focus solely on eliminating domestic price rigidities and ignore external factors such as
exchange rate movements, even in the presence of monopolistic distortions in goods markets
and terms of trade distortions which are not internalized by domestic producers. Under LCP,
we show that small open economy central banks should fix their exchange rate. Our results
contrast with those in the literature for large open economies, where it is not optimal to
mimic the flexible price allocation under PCP or to fix the exchange rate under LCP when
substitutability differs from one.
We also calculate the welfare gains from cooperation among national monetary authorities.
We show that for any elasticity in PCP and LCP, in both complete markets and financial
autarky, international monetary cooperation has no impact on welfare. Price stability is the
dominant strategy for central banks under PCP, and is thus a Nash Equilibrium in both non-
cooperative and cooperative scenarios, while a fixed exchange rate is a Nash Equilibrium under
LCP in both non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios. As a result, no benefits arise from
cross-country monetary policy cooperation.
Our goal in this paper has been to provide a unifying framework for the analysis of opti-
mal monetary policy in small open economies. We focus on the classic benchmark cases, PCP
and LCP in both complete markets and financial autarky, to try and gain intuition and under-
standing about what differentiates policymaking in small and large open economies, particularly
when risk sharing is not provided by terms of trade movements.
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A Appendix
A.1 Risk-sharing
The household in country i will maximize lifetime utility (1), subject to the following budget
constraint and transversality condition:
Ci(st)Pi(st) = Wi(st)Ni(st) +
∫ 1
0
Eij(st)Bij(st)dj, (A.1)
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj = 0. (A.2)
Bij(st) denotes the state-contingent bond that pays in currency j in state st; qj(st) is the price of
that bond in period 0 (when all trading occurs), qj(st) is arbitrary up to a constant. Household
in period 0 cares about relative price of claims across states and currencies. The transverality
condition stipulates that all period 0 transactions must be balanced: payment for claims issued
must equal payment for claims received. The household Lagrangian is:
Li =
∞∑
t=1
βtPr(st)
{
Ui(C(st))− Vi(N(st)) + λi(st)
Pi(st)
[
Wi(st)Ni(st) +
∫ 1
0
EijBij(st)(st)dj − Ci(st)Pi(st)
]}
− λi0
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj, (A.3)
Now take the FOC with respect to state contingent bonds Bij(st):
∂Li
∂Bij(st)
= λi0qj(st) +
βtλi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
Pi(st)
= 0, (A.4)
which gives price of the state-contingent bond,
qj(st) = β
tλi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
λi0Pi(st)
. (A.5)
The analogous FOC for country j,
∂Lj
∂Bjj(st)
= 0 will yield:
qj(st) = β
tλj(st)Pr(st)Ejj(st)
λj0Pj(st)
. (A.6)
Using Ejj(st) = 1 and setting (A.5) equal to (A.6), we get the risk-sharing condition
λi(st)
λj(st)
=
λi0
λj0
Pi(st)
Pj(st)Eij(st) . (A.7)
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When PPP holds, Pi(st)
Pj(st)Eij(st) = 1, and the risk-sharing condition simplifies to
λi(st)
λj(st)
=
(
Ci(st)
Cj(st)
)−σ
=
λi0
λj0
. When the consumption ratio is constant across countries, Cit = AiCwt.
In order to solve for Ai, we substitute (A.5) into the transversality condition.
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj =
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
λi0Pi(st)
Bij(st)dj
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
∫ 1
0
Eij(st)Bij(st)dj
(A.1)
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
(
Pi(st)Ci(st)−Wi(st)Ni(st)
)
= 0
We substitute Ci(st) = AiCw(st) into the above equation, and solve for Ai.
Ai =
∑∞
t=1
∑
st
βt W (st)N(st)
P (st)
λi(st)Pr(st)∑∞
t=1
∑
st
βtCw(st)λi(st)Pr(st)
=
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
WtNt
Pt
λi(st)
}
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1 {Cwtλi(st)}
=
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wtλi(st)
}
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1 {Cwtλi(st)}
=
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wtC
−σ
wt
}
∑∞
t=1 β
tEt−1
{
CwtC
−σ
wt
}
where we used λi(st) = A
−σ
i C
−σ
w (st). This gives us the definition of complete markets from the
text, equation (20).
A.2 Closed Economy
Proposition 2 In the closed economy under ex ante commitment, the central bank will maxi-
mize (24) subject to (25) and (26). The solution to this problem is: Ct =
(
1−τ
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . Price
stability is the optimal policy, as the central bank exactly replicates the flexible price allocation.
Proof: The flexible price allocation is obtained from solving this two equation system in
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two unknowns (C,N):
1 =
µχ
1− τ
N1+ϕt
C1−σt
,
Ct = ZtNt.
The solution is Ct =
(
1−τ
µχ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . Now, let’s reformulate the central bank’s problem by
substituting the labor market clearing condition (25) and the goods market clearing condition
(26) into the objective function.
max
Ct
Et−1
{
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
C1+ϕt Z
−1−ϕ
t
(1 + ϕ)
}
s.t.
1 =
µχ
1− τ
Et−1
{
C1+ϕt Z
−(1+ϕ)
t
}
Et−1C1−σt
.
The Lagrangian for this constrained optimization problem is
L = Et−1
{
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
C1+ϕt Z
−1−ϕ
t
(1 + ϕ)
}
+ λ
(
Et−1C1−σt −
µχ
1− τ Et−1
{
C1+ϕt Z
−(1+ϕ)
t
})
. (A.8)
The first order condition with respect to consumption is15
∂L
∂Ct
= (1 + λ(1− σ))C−σt − χ
(
1 +
λµ
1− τ
)
Cϕt Z
−1−ϕ
t = 0. (A.9)
which is equivalent to
C1−σt = χ
(
1 + λµ
1−τ
1 + λ(1− σ)
)
N1+ϕt = 0. (A.10)
Given that λ is a constant and not a variable, the first order condition and the budget constraint
are satisfied only under the flexible price equilibrium. Thus, the central bank’s optimal policy
is to mimic the flexible price equilibrium in the closed economy. 
Proposition 3 In the closed economy, the social planner will maximize (24) subject to (26),
ignoring the labor condition (25). The solution to this problem is: Ct =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . The
social planner will replicate the flexible price allocation and remove the monopolistic markup,
yielding the Pareto efficient allocation.
Proof: Insert the aggregate goods market clearing constraint (26) directly into the objective
15One can easily carry out the same exercise by optimizing with respect to labor.
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function, replacing Nt+1, and maximize this objective function.
max
Ct+1
[
C1−σt+1
1− σ −
χ
1 + ϕ
(
Ct+1
Zt+1
)1+ϕ]
The solution to this optimization problem is Ct =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
t . 
A.3 Global Social Planner
Proposition 4 The global social planner will maximize utility weighted over all i countries
(27), subject to (28) and (29). The solution to this optimization problem is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1
1 + ϕ
)
,
Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w ,
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i ,
Yi =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i ,
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
.
The global social planner solution exactly replicates the flexible price allocation while eliminating
monopolistic markups, yielding the Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof: If we substitute (28) and (29) directly into the objective function (27), then we can
reformulate the problem as follows:
max
∀cij
∫ 1
0

[∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] γ(1−σ)
γ−1
1− σ −
χ
1 + ϕ
[∫ 1
0
cjidj
Zi
]1+ϕ di. (A.11)
Rearranging, we have
max
cij
1
1− σ
∫ 1
0
[∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] γ(1−σ)
γ−1
di− χ
1 + ϕ
∫ 1
0
[∫ 1
0
cjidj
]1+ϕ
Z1+ϕi
di. (A.12)
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The FOC with respect to cij is
0 =
[∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] γ(1−σ)
γ−1 −1
c
−1
γ
ij − χ
[∫ 1
0
cjidj
]ϕ
Z1+ϕj
. (A.13)
This is equivalent to
0 =
([∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
] 1−σγ
γ−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
1−σγ
γ
i
c
−1
γ
ij − χ
[∫ 1
0
cjidj
Zj
]ϕ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Nϕj
1
Zj
,
⇒0 = C
1−σγ
γ
i c
− 1
γ
ij − χ
Nϕj
Zj
,
and solving for cij we have:
cij =
Zγj C
1−γσ
i
χγNγϕj
. (A.14)
The consumption basket in country i (Ci) can then be expressed as:
Ci =
(∫ 1
0
c
γ−1
γ
ij dj
) γ
γ−1
,
=
∫ 1
0
[
Zγj C
1−γσ
i
χγNγϕj
] γ−1
γ
dj

γ
γ−1
,
=
(
1
χ
) 1
σ
(∫ 1
0
[
Zj
Nϕj
](γ−1)
dj
) 1
σ(γ−1)
. (A.15)
So Ci does not depend on its own technology Zi. Now, let’s solve for labor (Ni) and output
(Yi).
Ni =
Yi
Zi
from goods market clearing
=
∫ 1
0
cjidj
Zi
from (29)
=
∫ 1
0
[
Zγi C
1−γσ
j
χγNγϕi
]
dj
Zi
from (A.14)
=
Zγ−1i
χγNγϕi
∫ 1
0
C1−γσj dj (A.16)
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From (A.15), we know that Ci = Cj = C for all i, j. So we can take Cj outside of the integral
in (A.16) and solve for Ni:
Ni =
Zγ−1i C
1−γσ
j
χγNγϕi
⇒ Ni =
(
Zγ−1i C
1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
. (A.17)
Similarly, output will be:
Yi =
(
Z
γ(1+ϕ)
i C
1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
. (A.18)
Substitute (A.17) and (A.18) back into the definition of the consumption basket (A.15), and
solve for the consumption basket C in each country, which will be identical:
C =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ
∫ 1
0
(Zγ−1j C1−γσ
χγ
) 1
1+γϕ
−(γ−1)ϕ Zγ−1j dj

1
σ(γ−1)
,
C
σ+ϕ
(1+γϕ)σ =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ
∫ 1
0
(
Zγ−1j
χγ
)− (γ−1)ϕ
1+γϕ
Zγ−1j dj

1
σ(γ−1)
,
⇒ C = Ci =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1+γϕ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
. (A.19)
Solve for labor and output by substituting (A.19) into (A.17) and (A.18) respectively:
Ni =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1−γσ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i , (A.20)
Yi =
(
1
χ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
j dj
) 1−γσ
(σ+ϕ)(γ−1)
Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i . (A.21)
This is the Pareto efficient allocation. When γ →∞, the flexible price allocation and the global
social planner allocation become identical. Consumption is identical to the first order between
social planner and flexible price allocation. However, it is not true for labor. 
A.4 Complete Markets and Financial Autarky
Proposition 5 In complete markets, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (30a) and
cooperative central banks will maximize (30b), subject to (31), (32), (33) and (34). The solution
under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central banks in complete markets
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is:
E{Ui} = C1−σi
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ−1
1+γϕ
i
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
(1−γσ)(1+ϕ)
(1+γϕ)(σ+ϕ)
w Z
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mimick-
ing the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central banks
in complete markets, and is the optimal policy under cooperation.
Proposition 6 In financial autarky, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (30a) and
cooperative central banks will maximize (30b), subject to (35), (36), (37) and (38). The solution
under commitment for both cooperative and non-cooperative central banks in financial autarky
is:
E{Ui} = Ci
(
1
1− σ −
1− τi
µ(1 + ϕ)
)
,
Ci =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1+ϕ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
,
Ni =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1−σ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
,
Yi =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
(
Zγ−1i Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w
) 1−σ
1−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
Zi,
Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
i di
) 1−σ+γ(σ+ϕ)
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
.
The resulting equilibrium allocation exactly coincides with the flexible price allocation. Mimick-
ing the flexible price allocation is thus the dominant strategy for non-cooperative central banks
in financial autarky, and is the optimal policy under cooperation.
Proof: The objective function for non-cooperative and cooperative central banks will be,
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respectively:
max
Nit
Et−1
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
, (A.22a)
max
∀Nit
∫ 1
0
{
C1−σit
1− σ − χ
N1+ϕit
1 + ϕ
}
di. (A.22b)
Policymakers in each scenario will maximize their objective function subject to the following
constraints:
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1
{
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
} , (A.23)
Yit = ZitNit, (A.24)
Cwt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
γ−1
γ
it
) γ
γ−1
. (A.25)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Y
γ−1
γ
it
}
(A.26a)
Cit = C
1
γ
wtY
γ−1
γ
it (A.26b)
where (A.26a) refers to goods market clearing under complete markets, while (A.26b) refers
to goods market clearing under financial autarky. We can formulate a Lagrangian for the
non-cooperative and cooperative cases:
L = Et−1
{
C1−σit
}
1− σ − χ
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
1 + ϕ
+ λi
(
Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
})
(A.27a)
L =
∫ 1
0
[
Et−1
{
C1−σit
}
1− σ − χ
Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
1 + ϕ
+ λi
(
Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
})]
di
(A.27b)
Using Cit = C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
N
γ−1
γ
it Z
γ−1
γ
it
}
for complete markets, or Cit = C
1
γ
wtN
γ−1
γ
it Z
γ−1
γ
it for financial
autarky, we can take the first order condition with respect to Nit.
16 The FOC will be identical
16Remember that we are optimizing given the fact that state st is realized. Expectations in our context thus
refer to a summation over all possible states multiplied by the probability of each state occuring. For
example, Et−1{C1−σit } =
∑
st
C1−σi (st)Pr(st).
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in both cases.
∂L
∂Nit
= C−σit (1 + λi(1− σ))
(
γ − 1
γ
)Y γ−1γit C 1γwt
Nit
− χ(1 + λ µ
1− τi (1 + ϕ)
)
1
Nit
N1+ϕit = 0
(A.28)
In equilibrium, this equals:
1 = χ
(
1 + λiµ(1+ϕ)
1−τi
1 + λi(1−σ)(γ−1)
γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Constant
 N1+ϕit
C−σit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
 . (A.29)
This equation holds in both complete markets and financial autarky, and differs from the flexible
price equilibrium only by the constant term. However, subject to labor market clearing, this
constant will coincide with the flexible price equilibrium. The flexible price equilibrium in
complete markets and financial autarky is found by taking expectations out of the labor market
clearing condition (A.23) and substituting in goods market clearing (A.24):
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
Y
1+ϕγ
γ
it
C−σit C
1
γ
wtZ
1+ϕ
it
. (A.30)
For complete markets, we can express output as a function of technology and a constant term by
substituting (A.26a) into (A.30): Yit = AiZ
γ(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it . (We can do the same for exercise for autarky
by substituting (A.26b) into (A.30), but leave that to the reader). Using this expression for
output, consumption in complete markets in country i can be expressed as
Cit = A
γ−1
γ
i C
1
γ
wtEt−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}
. (A.31)
Now substitute (A.31) back into the flexible price equilibrium (A.30)
1 =
(
χµ
1− τi
)
C
σ
γ
wtA
(γ−1)σ
γ
i Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}σ
A
1+ϕγ
γ
i C
− 1
γ
wt , (A.32)
and rearrange and solve for Ai:
Ai =
[(
1− τi
χµ
)γ
C1−σwt Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}−σγ] 11−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (A.33)
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Now, substitute the solution for Ai, (A.33), into (A.31):
Cit =
[(
χµ
1− τi
)1−γ
Cϕ+1wt Et−1
{
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
it
}1+γϕ] 11−σ+γ(ϕ+σ)
. (A.34)
Using the fact that Cwt =
∫ 1
0
Citdi and setting Zw =
(∫ 1
0
Z
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
1+γϕ
i di
) 1+γϕ
(γ−1)(1+ϕ)
, consumption
for country i in complete markets is:
Cit =
(
1− τi
χµ
) 1
σ+ϕ
Z
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ
w . (A.35)
Solving for labor and output using (A.35) is a straightforward exercise. The solution to the
central bank’s problem in complete markets and financial autarky for cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria, coincides exactly with the flexible price allocation. Here we’ve explicitly
outlined the proof for complete markets. The proof for financial autarky is identical up to
(A.30). We simply substitute (A.26b) into (A.30) to get the optimal allocation under financial
autarky. 
B Local Currency Pricing
Proposition 7 Under LCP, non-cooperative central banks will maximize (30a) subject to (39)
and (40). A fixed exchange rate will be the Nash equilibrium policy for a non-cooperative central
bank in both complete markets and financial autarky under LCP.
Proof:
In this section we explain the case of LCP in the continuum framework. First, let another
country j import goods from firm h in country i.
B.1 Price Setting
Profits from the exports of firm h in country i to country j in domestic currency will be:
Pjit(h)EijtCjit(h)−WitNjit(h) (B.1)
where Pjit(h) denotes the price charged by firm h in country j which is located in country i.
This price will be denominated in currency j. Njit(h) is the amount of labor used by firm h
(which is manufacturing in country i) in the production of its exports to country j. Given this,
firm h will choose the price that maximizes its expected profit:
Et−1
{
C−σit
(
Pjit(h)EijtCjit(h)−WitNjit(h)
CPIit
)}
. (B.2)
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We also have demand for firm h’s good:
Cjit(h) =
(
Pjit(h)
Pjit
)−ε
Cjit. (B.3)
In order to solve the maximization problem, we substitute the demand for firm h’s good (B.3)
into the expected profit function (B.2) and take the FOC with respect to Pjit(h). The FOC
will be:
Et−1
{
C−σit
(
Pjit(h)EijtCjit(h)
Pjit(h)CPIit
)}
=
ε
ε− 1Et−1
{
WitNjit(h)
Pjit(h)CPIit
}
(B.4)
Pjit(h) on the LHS will cancel out, and we will be left with:
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtCjit(h)
CPIit
}
= µEt−1
{
C−σit
WitNjit(h)
Pjit(h)CPIit
}
(B.5)
B.2 Labor Market Clearing
We can take out the h index for firms because they are all identical. Now, substituting labor
supply χ
1−τi
Wit
CPIit
= NϕitC
σ
it into the above equation, we get
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtCjit
CPIit
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
NϕitNjit
Pjit
}
. (B.6)
Substituting the identities Njit = CjitZ
−1
it and Cjit =
(
Pjit
CPIjt
)−γ
Cjt into the above equation
gives:
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtP−γjit CPIγjtCjit
CPIit
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
NϕitP
−γ
jit CPI
γ
jtCjit
ZitPjit
}
. (B.7)
Now we use the fact that CPIit, Pjit and Nit are predetermined:
Et−1
{
C−σit
EijtYitPjitCjt
CPIit
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit Cjt
}
. (B.8)
The next step in our derivation requires that we assume there is a common numeraire country,
call it 0, and all countries fix their currency with respect to this numeraire currency. This
means that Eijt = Ei0tE0jt. When combined with predetermined prices and output, the following
condition emerges:
Et−1
{
C−σit
YitPjit
CPIit
Ei0t
}
=
χµ
1− τi
Et−1 {Cjt}Et−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
Et−1 {E0jtCjt} (B.9)
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B.3 Nash Equilibrium
Here we assume that all countries, with the expection of country i, have a fixed exchange rate
with the numeraire currency, such that E0jt = 1. Given this assumption, the labor clearing
condition becomes
Et−1
{
C−σit
YitPjit
CPIit
Ei0t
}
=
χµ
1− τiEt−1
{
N1+ϕit
}
. (B.10)
Let us now write out the same equation for the numeraire country exporting to i and j respec-
tively:
Et−1
{
C−σ0t
Y0tPi0t
CPI0t
E00t
}
=
χµ
1− τ0Et−1
{
N1+ϕ0t
} Et−1Cit
Et−1[E0itCit] , (B.11)
Et−1
{
C−σ0t
Y0tPj0t
CPI0t
E00t
}
=
χµ
1− τ0Et−1
{
N1+ϕ0t
} Et−1Cjt
Et−1[E0jtCjt] . (B.12)
If we divide (B.11) by (B.12), and use the fact that prices are predetermined and E0jt = 1, we
get
Pi0t
Pj0t
=
CPIit
CPIjt
=
CPIit
CPI0t
=
Et−1Cit
Et−1[E0itCit] . (B.13)
B.4 Financial Autarky
In autarky, we assume all economies in the rest of the world (−i) are ex-ante identical and
that the actions of country i will not influence their policy decisions. Therefore, prices and
price indices will be equalized across all −i countries, so that P0it = Pjit and CPI0t = CPIjt
respectively. This will lead to the following set of identities:
Cit =
∫ 1
0
CjitP0itEijtdj
CPIit
=
P0it
CPIit
∫ 1
0
CjitEijtdj = P0it
CPIit
Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj = P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit.
(B.14)
Output is standard:
Yit =
∫ 1
0
Cjitdj =
∫ 1
0
(
Pjit
CPIjt
)−γ
Cjtdj =
(
P0it
CPI0t
)−γ
Cwt, (B.15)
P0it
CPI0t
= Y
−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt. (B.16)
Now we can plug these equations into the labor market clearing equation (39).
Et−1C1−σit =
χµ
1− τiEt−1N
1+ϕ
it (B.17)
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Goods market clearing will be the following
Cit =
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit = P0it
CPI0t
CPI0t
CPIit
Ei0tYit = Ei0tCPI0t
CPIit
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt. (B.18)
Using (B.13), this can be rewritten as:
Cit =
Et−1 {E0itCit}
E0itEt−1 {Cit}Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt. (B.19)
The optimization problem of the non-cooperative central bank in country i will then be:
L =Et−1
{
C1−σit
}− χY 1+ϕit Et−1 {Z−1−ϕit }+ λ1 [Et−1C1−σit − χµ1− τiEt−1N1+ϕit
]
+ λ2
[
Cit − Et−1[E0itCit]E0itEt−1Cit Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt
]
(B.20)
Maximization with respect to E0it will yield the following FOC:
∂L
∂E0it =−
1
E0itY
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt +
Et−1[E0itCit]
E20itEt−1Cit
Y
γ−1
γ
it C
1
γ
wt = 0
⇒ Et−1 {E0itCit} =E0itEt−1 {Cit} (B.21)
This proves that the optimal exchange rate chosen by the central bank must not be state-
contingent. In other words, the central bank will choose to fix its exchange rate.
B.5 Complete Markets
In this section, we assume that the degree of exchange rate pass-through is governed by pa-
rameter η ∈ [0, 1], where η = 1 is perfect pass-through (PCP) and η = 0 is zero pass-through
(LCP). Maximization of (A.3) with respect to state contingent bonds yields the following FOC:
λi(st)
λj(st)
=
λi0
λj0
Pi(st)
Pj(st)Eij(st) =
λi0
λj0
Eηi0t(st)
Eηj0t(st)Eij(st)
=
λi0
λj0
Eη−1ijt (B.22)
Using marginal utility, this will become:
C−σit
C−σjt
= Eη−1ijt . (B.23)
So we can express consumption in the following way: Cit = AiE
1−η
σ
ijt Cjt. Using the fact that
Cjt = Cwt, this will become Cit = AiE
1−η
σ
i0t Cwt. To find Ai we plug this expression into the
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transversality condition.
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
qj(st)Bij(st)dj =
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
∫ 1
0
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)Eij(st)
λi0Pi(st)
Bij(st)dj
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
∫ 1
0
Eij(st)Bij(st)dj
(A.1)
=
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt
λi(st)Pr(st)
λi0Pi(st)
(
Pi(st)Ci(st)−Wi(st)Ni(st)− Πi(st)
)
= 0
Ai =
∑∞
t=0
∑
st
βt W (st)N(st)
P (st)
λi(st)Pr(st)∑∞
t=0
∑
st
βtE
1−η
σ
i0t Cw(st)λi(st)Pr(st)
=
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
WtNt
Pt
λi(st)
}
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt−1
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t Cwtλi(st)
}
=
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt {YitTOTitλi(st)}∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t Cwtλi(st)
}
=
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
YitTOTitC
−σ
wt
}
∑∞
t=0 β
tEt
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t CwtC
−σ
wt
}
Given the solution for Ai, it follows that:
Cit =
∑∞
t=0 β
tE0
{
YitTOTitC
−σ
wt
}
∑∞
t=0 β
tE0
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t C
1−σ
wt
} E 1−ησi0t Cwt. (B.24)
If technology shocks are independent across time, then Cit =
Et−1{YitTOTitC−σwt }
Et−1
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t C
1−σ
wt
} E 1−ησi0t Cwt. As-
suming independence of shocks across countries as well, we obtain Cit =
Et−1{YitTOTit}
Et−1
{
E
1−η
σ
i0t
} E 1−ησi0t .
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Under LCP, if all countries except i have a fixed exchange rate, we have
Cit =Et−1
{∫ 1
0
CjitP0itEijtdj
CPIit
}
E
1
σ
i0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
}
=Et−1
{
P0it
CPIit
Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj
} E 1σi0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
}
=Et−1
{
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit
} E 1σi0t
Et−1[E
1
σ
i0t]
Now we assume σ = 1, so that we have log utility. The goods market clearing constraint in
complete markets will then be:
Cit =
P0it
CPIit
Ei0tYit (B.25)
Notice that this expression is identical to (40), the goods market clearing constraint in financial
autarky. Since the labor equilibrium condition is also identical to the labor equilibrium condi-
tion in autarky, and the objective function does not change, the solution to the central bank’s
optimization problem in complete markets will be identical to that in autarky.

Proposition 8 Under LCP, cooperative central banks will maximize (30b) subject to (41) and
(42). The optimal policy for cooperative central banks in both complete markets and financial
autarky will be a fixed exchange rate.
Proof:
B.6 Financial Autarky
Cit =
∫ 1
0
CjitPjitEijtdj
CPIit
(B.26)
Now we assume σ = 1, and Pjit = P0it = CPI0t = CPIit because of ex-ante symmetry, so the
above equation becomes:
Cit = Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj. (B.27)
B.7 Complete Markets
Cit = Et−1
{∫ 1
0
CjitP0itEijtdj
CPIit
}
E
1
σ
i0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
} = Et−1{ P0it
CPIit
Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj
} E 1σi0t
Et−1
{
E
1
σ
i0t
}
(B.28)
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Again, we assume σ = 1, and Pjit = P0it = CPI0t = CPIit because of ex-ante symmetry, so
the above equation becomes:
Cit = Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjitE0jtdj. (B.29)
Notice that this expression is identical to autarky. Since the labor equilibrium condition is also
identical to autarky, the optimization problem for cooperative central banks under LCP will
be identical in complete markets and autarky.
We know that output will be predetermined because prices are predetermined. As a result,
exchange rate policy can affect only consumption, but not labor. Therefore the maximization
problem faced by cooperative central banks will be as follows:
L =
∫ 1
0
C1−σit di =
∫ 1
0
C1−σit di+
∫ 1
0
λit
(
Cit − Ei0t
∫ 1
0
CjtE−1j0tdj
)
di. (B.30)
The FOC with respect to Ei0t is
∂L
∂Ei0t = −λit
Cit
Ei0t +
∫ 1
0
λjtEj0tCitE−2i0t dj = 0, (B.31)
which yields the following condition:
λitEi0t =
∫ 1
0
λjtEj0tdj. (B.32)
The above equation holds for all i, j pairs, so that λitEi0t = λjtEj0t. This equation holds when
exchange rates are fixed. 
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